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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                                            
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
         In Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), the 
Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C.  1983 does not provide a cause 
of action to recover monetary compensation for an allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment where recovery would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal 
conviction of a state court.  In these consolidated civil rights 
actions, Jay Smith seeks monetary compensation for his allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction and imprisonment on murder charges.  
On direct appeal from Smith's murder conviction, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania reversed that conviction due to a state-law 
evidentiary error and remanded for a new trial.  Before the 
retrial, however, that court ordered the dismissal of all charges 
against Smith based on newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  In these ensuing civil rights cases, the defendants 
unsuccessfully sought dismissal of Smith's claims on statute of 
limitations grounds, arguing that they accrued when his 
conviction was reversed, even though he was still the subject of 
an ongoing prosecution at that time.  Since Smith's claims were 
filed more than two years after that reversal but within two 
years of the dismissal of all charges against him, we must decide 
whether, under the teachings of Heck, a claim is cognizable under 
 1983 where its success would necessarily imply the invalidity 
of a future conviction that might be entered on a pending 
criminal charge.  We hold that such a claim is not cognizable 
under  1983.  It necessarily follows that claims like those of 
Smith do not accrue so long as the potential for a judgment in 
the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist.  Since this 
potential existed in Smith's case until the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court ordered the charges dismissed on September 18, 1992, 
Smith's claims did not accrue before that date.  Accordingly, 
Smith's claims were timely filed and we will affirm. 
          
                                I. 
         In April 1986, a jury convicted Smith of the murders of 
Susan Reinert and her children.  Smith immediately appealed.  
While the appeal was ongoing in July 1988, the government 
disclosed that police investigators had withheld potentially 
exculpatory evidence.  On December 22, 1989, on direct appeal 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed Smith's convictions on 
the unrelated ground that the Court of Common Pleas had 
improperly admitted hearsay evidence.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 
A.2d 600 (Pa. 1989).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded for 
a new trial. 
         Smith remained in prison pending a second trial.  He 
promptly moved to dismiss the ongoing prosecution on double 
jeopardy grounds, arguing that the withholding of exculpatory 
evidence at the first trial amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.  
Smith had not previously raised this issue because he had not 
learned of the misconduct until after his trial and because the 
supporting evidence was not part of the record on direct appeal.  
On September 18, 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered all 
charges dismissed based on the double jeopardy clause of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 
(Pa. 1992).  The court held that Pennsylvania's double jeopardy 
clause prevented retrial because the withholding of evidence was 
"intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point 
of the denial of a fair trial."  Id. at 325.  Smith was 
immediately released. 
         On September 15, 1993, Smith filed a  1983 claim 
against John Holtz, Ronald Colyer, Victor Dove, John Purcell, 
William Lander, and Paul Yatron (the "Holtz case").  Holtz, 
Colyer, Dove, Purcell, and Lander were government officials 
involved in the investigation.  Yatron was an attorney with the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General's office.  Smith alleged that the 
misconduct in connection with the concealing of the exculpatory 
evidence violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  On September 14, 1994, Smith filed a separate  1983 
suit against Joseph Wambaugh (the "Wambaugh case").  He claimed 
that Wambaugh, an author, had conspired with police investigators 
to conceal exculpatory evidence and to fabricate evidence linking 
Smith to the murders, in order to make money from a book and a 
television mini-series.  He alleged violations of his Fourth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  In both cases he sought 
to recover the damages resulting from his unlawful conviction and 
confinement. 
         The defendants in both cases argued that Smith's claims 
were time-barred by the applicable two-year Pennsylvania statute 
of limitations because they accrued when his conviction was 
reversed in 1989.  Based on Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 
(1994), the district court concluded that Smith's  1983 claims 
were timely filed because they did not accrue until the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered all charges dismissed in 1992.  
We consolidated the interlocutory appeals filed by all defendants 
under 28 U.S.C.  1292(b). 
 
                               II. 
         The outcome of this appeal turns on Heck v. Humphrey, 
114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994).  Heck was convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter in a state court.  While his direct appeal was 
pending, he filed a  1983 suit against two prosecutors and a 
government investigator.  He sought monetary damages resulting 
from his allegedly unlawful conviction.  The district court 
dismissed the case and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed.  Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the state 
supreme court denied relief in Heck's direct appeal of his 
criminal conviction, the district court denied Heck's habeas 
petition, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed that denial.  Id. at 
2368. 
         The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether 
under  1983 a state prisoner could pursue money damages premised 
on an allegedly unlawful outstanding conviction.  The Court began 
its analysis by noting that since  1983 creates a species of 
tort liability, the common law of torts "provide[s] the 
appropriate starting point for the inquiry."  Id. at 2370.  The 
Court observed that the common law tort of malicious prosecution 
was analogous to Smith's claim because a malicious prosecution 
claim allows a plaintiff to recover for unlawful imprisonment 
pursuant to legal process.  A necessary element of a malicious 
prosecution claim is the termination of the criminal proceedings 
in favor of the accused: 
         This requirement "avoids parallel litigation over the 
         issue of probable cause and guilt . . . and it 
         precludes the possibility of the claimant [sic] 
         succeeding in the tort action after having been 
         convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in 
         contravention of a strong judicial policy against the 
         creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of 
         the same or identical transaction."  Furthermore, "to 
         permit a convicted criminal defendant to proceed with a 
         malicious prosecution claim would permit a collateral 
         attack on the conviction through the vehicle of a civil 
         suit." 
Id. at 2371 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
         For these reasons the Court held that "the hoary 
principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles 
for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments 
applies to  1983 damage actions that necessarily require the 
plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or 
confinement."  Id. at 2372.  Accordingly, "in order to recover 
damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose 
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a  
 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has 
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 
determination, or called into question by a federal court's 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."  Id.  A claim seeking such 
damages is not cognizable under  1983 even though such claim is 
within the literal terms of  1983.  Id. 
         Accordingly, a "district court must consider whether a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the 
invalidity of his conviction or sentence."  Id.  If not, the 
action should be allowed to proceed: 
         For example, a suit for damages attributable to an 
         allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the 
         challenged search produced evidence that was introduced 
         in a state criminal trial resulting in the  1983 
         plaintiff's still-outstanding conviction.  Because of 
         doctrines like independent source and inevitable 
         discovery, and especially harmless error, such a  1983 
         action, even if successful would not necessarily imply 
         that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful.  In order 
         to recover compensatory damages, however, the  1983 
         plaintiff must prove not only that the search was 
         unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable 
         injury, which, we hold today, does not encompass the 
         "injury" of being convicted and imprisoned (until his 
         conviction has been overturned). 
Id. at 2372-73 n.7 (citations omitted). 
         Since Heck's claims challenged the legality of his 
conviction and his conviction remained in effect, the Court 
dismissed Heck's claims as not cognizable under  1983.  Id. at 
2374. 
         Smith asserts in his complaints that the defendants 
suppressed exculpatory evidence and contrived inculpatory 
evidence.  His claims seek damages resulting from his unlawful 
conviction and confinement.  If he had brought these claims 
before September 18, 1992, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
ordered the charges against him dismissed, success on these 
claims would have necessarily implied the invalidity of any 
future conviction on the still pending criminal charges. 
         Heck did not directly address claims that, if 
successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential 
conviction on a pending criminal charge.  In certain portions of 
the opinion, the Court spoke in terms of claims that, if 
successful, imply the invalidity of "outstanding" convictions.  
Other portions of the opinion, however, refer to claims that, if 
successful, imply the invalidity of convictions without 
specifying whether this includes claims that, if successful, 
would imply the invalidity of potential convictions that may 
result from pending charges. 
         The Supreme Court did not address this issue because it 
was not presented by the facts in Heck.  The Court had before it 
the  1983 claim of a plaintiff who was serving a sentence on an 
outstanding conviction.  The Court thus had no occasion to 
determine the scope of permissible  1983 claims by a defendant 
in an ongoing criminal prosecution.  Accordingly, we must look to 
the reasoning behind the Heck rule to determine whether a claim 
that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a 
conviction on pending criminal charges is cognizable under  
 1983. 
         The Supreme Court observed that the problem presented 
by Heck's case is that it lay "at the intersection" of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 and the federal habeas corpus statute.  Heck, 
114 S. Ct. at 2369.  Some accommodation was required because the 
federal habeas statute has an express exhaustion requirement that 
precludes the filing of a federal habeas petition holding the 
potential for interference with determinations made in state 
criminal proceedings, while  1983 requires no exhaustion of 
state remedies.  Id.  The Court accommodated these two statutes 
by holding that  1983 actions are subject to the "hoary 
principle" that civil tort actions are not the appropriate 
vehicle for challenging the validity of convictions and 
sentences.  The express objectives of this holding were to 
preserve consistency and finality, and to prevent "a collateral 
attack on [a] conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit."  
Id. at 2371.  
         We find that these concerns apply equally to claims 
that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a 
future conviction on a pending criminal charge.  A claim by a 
defendant in an ongoing criminal prosecution which necessarily 
challenges the legality of a future conviction on a pending 
criminal charge lies at the intersection of the federal habeas 
corpus statute and the Civil Rights Act of 1871.  If such a claim 
could proceed while criminal proceedings are ongoing, there would 
be a potential for inconsistent determinations in the civil and 
criminal cases and the criminal defendant would be able to 
collaterally attack the prosecution in a civil suit.  In terms of 
the conflicts which Heck sought to avoid, there is no difference 
between a conviction which is outstanding at the time the civil 
rights action is instituted and a potential conviction on a 
pending charge that may be entered at some point thereafter.       
         Because of these concerns, we hold that a claim that, 
if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a 
conviction on a pending criminal charge is not cognizable under  
 1983.  See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(interpreting Heck to prevent accrual of  1983 claims that would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of convictions on pending 
criminal charges).  It necessarily follows that so long as 
success on such a claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of 
a conviction in the pending criminal prosecution, such a claim 
does not accrue so long as the potential for a judgment in the 
pending criminal prosecution continues to exist.  This did not 
occur in Smith's case until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
ordered the charges dismissed on September 18, 1992.  Smith's 
claims thus did not accrue before that date and, since he filed 
those claims within two years thereafter, they are not time 
barred.    
 
                               III. 
         Wambaugh argues, in the alternative, that if Smith's 
claims did not accrue before the 1992 dismissals, they have yet 
to accrue.  The contention is that a judicial finding of actual 
innocence is a prerequisite for a common law malicious 
prosecution claim and, accordingly, is a prerequisite here.  
Since the double jeopardy ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court was not premised on a finding of Smith's actual innocence, 
the argument goes, he has not satisfied that prerequisite.  We 
are unpersuaded. 
         First, Wambaugh misstates the common law of malicious 
prosecution.  Actual innocence is not required for a common law 
favorable termination, see Restatement of the Law of Torts  
 659, 660 (1938), and a dismissal of charges on double jeopardy 
grounds is a common law favorable termination.  E.g., Haefner v. 
Burkey, 626 A.2d 519, 521 (Pa. 1993).   
         But, more importantly, Wambaugh misreads Heck.  While 
the Heck court looked to the common law for guidance, it did so 
solely for the purpose of accommodating the congressional intent 
reflected in the civil rights and habeas corpus statutes.  As a 
result, Heck should not be read to incorporate all of the common 
law of malicious prosecution into the federal law governing civil 
rights cases of this kind.  Heck represents a limitation on the 
availability of relief for constitutional torts that extends no 
further than the congressional concerns which justify it.  As we 
have explained, those concerns dictate that a district court 
decline to entertain a civil rights claim asking monetary 
compensation for an allegedly unlawful conviction or imprisonment 
where success on that claim would necessarily imply the 
invalidity of an outstanding conviction or a potential conviction 
in a pending criminal proceeding.  When that outstanding 
conviction or that pending criminal proceeding ceases to exist, 
however, the justification for barring access to the federal 
courts likewise ceases. This means, among other things, that the 
rationale of Heck will not support a requirement that a civil 
rights plaintiff like Smith must have judicially established his 
innocence before invoking  1983. 
 
 
                               IV. 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
 
 
